Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural
http://www.resr.periodikos.com.br/article/doi/10.1590/1806-9479.2026.305516
Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural
ARTIGO ORIGINAL

Exports and welfare: why agricultural liberalization does not maximize trade in Brazil’s bilateral strategies

Exportações e bem-estar: por que a liberalização agrícola não maximiza o comércio nas estratégias bilaterais do Brasil

Michelle Márcia Viana Martins; Alice Aloísia da Cruz

http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1806-9479.2026.305516 resr, vol.64, e305516, 2026
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Abstract

This paper combines a computable general equilibrium model (PAEG), calibrated to GTAP 11 data for 2017, with a game-theoretic framework to examine how changes in domestic agricultural subsidies and import tariffs in the European Union, the United States, and China affect Brazilian export competitiveness and welfare. Five policy strategies are treated as strategic choices in three bilateral games, generating 75 scenarios. When exports are the payoff, Total Liberalization (TL) is strictly dominant and the Nash equilibrium is (TL, TL), with Brazilian export gains of USD 13.35 to 14.03 billion. When welfare is the payoff, measured as the equivalent variation of household consumption, Agricultural Liberalization (AL) becomes dominant and the equilibrium shifts to (AL, AL), with positive welfare for Brazil in all three games (USD 1.15 to 1.44 billion). Under (TL, TL), welfare turns negative because fiscal revenue losses and adverse price movements outweigh efficiency gains. A sensitivity analysis varying Armington elasticities by plus and minus 50% confirms the robustness of these equilibria. The results support negotiating packages that discipline partners’ subsidies while preserving part of Brazil’s tariff margin. The approach is designed for medium-term structural analysis of trade policy and does not capture short-run adjustment dynamics or distributional effects within Brazil.

Keywords

agricultural subsidies, tariffs, export competitiveness, game theory

Resumo

Este estudo combina um modelo de equilíbrio geral computável (PAEG), calibrado com dados do GTAP 11 para 2017, com teoria dos jogos para examinar como mudanças em subsídios agrícolas domésticos e tarifas de importação na União Europeia, nos Estados Unidos e na China afetam a competitividade exportadora e o bem-estar do Brasil. Cinco estratégias de política são tratadas como escolhas estratégicas em três jogos bilaterais, gerando 75 cenários. Quando as exportações são o payoff, a Liberalização Total (TL) é dominante e o equilíbrio de Nash é (TL, TL), com ganhos de exportação entre USD 13,35 e 14,03 bilhões. Quando o bem-estar é o payoff, medido pela variação equivalente do consumo, a Liberalização Agrícola (AL) torna-se dominante e o equilíbrio muda para (AL, AL), com bem-estar positivo nos três jogos (USD 1,15 a 1,44 bilhão). Sob (TL, TL), o bem-estar é negativo porque perdas de receita fiscal e movimentos de preços desfavoráveis superam os ganhos de eficiência. Uma análise de sensibilidade variando as elasticidades de Armington em mais e menos 50% confirma a robustez desses equilíbrios. Os resultados indicam que pacotes que disciplinem subsídios dos parceiros e preservem parte da margem tarifária brasileira são preferíveis à eliminação tarifária total. A abordagem é apropriada para análise estrutural de médio prazo da política comercial e não captura dinâmicas de ajustamento de curto prazo nem efeitos distributivos no Brasil.

Palavras-chave

subsídios agrícolas, tarifas, competitividade exportadora, teoria dos jogos

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Submitted date:
02/13/2026

Accepted date:
06/29/2026

Publication date:
08/13/2026

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